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NOTE: Effects of Soviet Ideology on the Legal
Framework and Policy of US-USSR Trade
Introduction: Theory
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) plays a dominant
role in decision-making at all governmental levels in the USSR. 1 This
note examines the role that ideology plays in Soviet foreign trade
policy, the structure of the Soviet foreign trade monopoly, and some of
the problems that American businessmen may encounter in trading with
the Soviets.
Essentially, Marxism is an analysis of history and a prediction. It
analyzes the stages of class dominance throughout history and explains
why the proletariat will eventually succeed to worldwide power.2 Karl
Marx predicted two essential steps in a successful communist 3 world
revolution. First, the revolution would originate in a highly self-suffi-
cient, industrialized nation;4 and, second, simultaneous revolutions
would occur throughout the industrialized world.5 But when the Bol-
sheviks finally consolidated power in Russia, they faced the task of feed-
ing a primarily agrarian nation, half-starved from the ravages of World
War I and a prolonged civil war, and alone in a world of hostile capitalist
states. Trade with the West became necessary for Lenin's government to
continue in power.6
Trade relations with capitalist countries presented the problem of
reconciling Soviet practice with Marxist doctrine. Marx had asserted that
legal norms must reflect the will of the ruling class. 7 Western interna-
tional legal norms obviously did not reflect the will of the Soviet ruling
class. Lenin reconciled this apparant contradiction by accepting these
I W. W. KULSKI, THE SOVIET REGIME 86 (1963); for a brief discussion of the Com-
munist Party as the source of all power in the USSR, see generally Osakwe, Legal and
Institutional Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade: Soviet Perspective, 8 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 85, 91 (1974); see also J. RESHETAR, THE SOVIET POLITY 230-231 (1971).
2 The best introduction to the basic tenets of Marxism is K. MARX & F. ENGELS,
THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848).
3 For purposes of this paper, "communist" will refer generally to a system of social
organization in which all economic and social activity is controlled by a single and self-
perpetuating party. "Capitalist" means generally a system in which market and economic
operations are left mainly to private incentives with relatively minimal state control.
"Western" is used interchangeably with "capitalist." It refers to ideological tendencies
rather than strict geographic location: for example, Japan is included under the term
"Western."
4 K. MARK & F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, in ESSENTIAL WORKS
OF MARXISM 24 (A. Mendel ed. 1965); G. KENNAN, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1917-
1941, 11-12 (1960).
5 Mendel, ed., supra note 4, at 24; G. KENNAN, supra note 4, 11-12; H. MARCUS,
SOVIET MARXISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 80 (1961). Marcus' book provides an ex-
cellent analysis of the relationship between Marxist theory and Soviet practice.
6 G. KENNAN, supra note 4, at 33.
7 Kamenka, The Soviet View of Law, in the SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM (R. Cornell
ed. 1970).
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Western norms so long as they were used in a manner which advanced the
policy and goals of the Soviet state. 8
The Soviet need for trade with the West produced another ideologi-
cal problem. According to Lenin, business transactions between capita-
list and less developed nations necessarily involved an "exploiter-
exploited" relationship. Since the Soviet Union would have. to assume
the role of the "exploited", trade with the West would have the effect of
partially subsidizing the capitalist system. 9 To appease purists in the
CPSU, Lenin rationalized that attracting the interest of Western enter-
prises would result in commercial tension and rivalry between capitalist
nations and hasten their ultimate collapse.10
Later, Stalin employed a policy of "autarky" to limit trade with the
West. The Soviets would deal with the West only to the extent necessary
to expedite Soviet self-sufficiency." The concept of "autarky" changed
when the Soviet Union extended its power into Eastern Europe after
World War II. Two world markets suddenly confronted each other-the
Western capitalist market and the Soviet-East European communist
market. Self-sufficiency extended to the communist bloc as a whole, 12
and the concept of international division of labor within the communist
bloc arose. Each communist country would specialize in specific indus-
trial areas and trade with its neighbors for needed goods.13
At the same time, the Soviet stance on trade with capitalist nations
was modified from greater to lesser emphasis on self-sufficiency. 14 The
result was to permit Western imports if they aided the rate of the eco-
nomy's growth per se. Although the policy of self-sufficiency of the
Soviet-East European market has also been relaxed since the early 1950S,
it continues to exert much influence on Soviet trade patterns.' 5 The
Soviet Union still conducts one-half to two-thirds of all its trade with
East European nations. 16
8 S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE 246-247 (1970). The Soviet Union did
not officially recognize this compromise of principles until 1956; see Hildebrand, Soviet
International Law:* An Exemplar for Optional Decision Theory Analysis, 20 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 141, 195 (1968).
9 P. -WILES, COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 8-10 (1969).
1o G. KENNAN, supra note 4, at 36.
'" P. UREN, EAST-WEST TRADE 71 (1966). The idea was that exports were to be
made only to obtain imports, and imports were sought only to remove costly bottlenecks
in Soviet production. The hope was that the imports would help to attain such a rate of
industrialization as to make international trade unnecessary in the future.
12 Id. at 75.
13 Id. at 84.
14 Smirnov, Zotov, and Shagalov, Evaluating the Economic Effectiveness of Foreign
Trade, 1 AM. REV. OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN TRADE 1, 3, 4 (1965).
15 For arguments by the Eastern European nations that too much trade with market
economies would create a detrimental rivalry with the communist world market, see gen-
erally E. TAMEDLY, SOCIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 269 (1969).
16 Diumulen, The Soviet Union in the System of International Economic Relations, 1 AM.
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The Soviets have found increasing trade with Western nations more
attractive for both economic and political reasons. Western technology,
expertise, and modem machinery help accelerate industrial growth and
exploitation of natural resources in the Soviet Union. American farm im-
ports have been increasingly in demand as a result of chronic Russian
agricultural shortages. Furthermore, the evolution of detente and the
Soviet ideological split with China have helped to create a climate more
conducive to US-USSR trade in the 1970s.
Soviet Foreign Trade Framework
The Western businessman confronts a foreign trade monopoly 17 in
the Soviet Union. The structure of the CPSU parallels that of the govern-
ment at all levels with the Party having ultimate authority.' 8 By control-
ling the government foreign trade monopoly, the CPSU insures con-
sistency with its overall domestic and foreign policy. 19
This state monopoly is the most.highly centralized branch of the
Soviet economy. 20 The State Planning Committee of the USSR Council
of Ministers (Gosplan), the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
Ministry of Foreign Trade jointly plan Soviet foreign trade policy. 21 Once
the Ministries have set trade policy for annual and five-year periods, 22
the planning groups of Soviet industries make recommendations to the
appropriate Soviet industrial ministry concerning particular areas where
foreign imports or assistance may increase productivity or resolve tech-
nological problems. If the industrial ministry approves the planning
group recommendations, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which is re-
sponsible for the administration of Soviet foreign trade, will use its sub-
ordinate Trade Representations and Foreign Trade Organizations to find
the best available foreign technology.23
The Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs) are the buying and
selling agents for Soviet industries. The FTOs pick the foreign supplier
REV. OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN TRADE 39, 43 (1965); Patolichev,
Foreign Trade: Opportunities and Prospects, SOVIET LIFE, March 1976, at 29.
17 Generally, "foreign trade monopoly" means that pnly the Soviet state or its autho-
rized subdivisions may engage in foreign trade operations. As a result, all private inter-
ests are excluded. See Osakwe, supra note 1, 93-97; for in depth treatment, see generally
J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY: INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS
(1974).
18 J. RESHETAR, supra note 1, at 230-231.
19 Osakwe, supra note 1, at 96.
20 R. STARR, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 26 (1975).
21 Id., at 26.
22 For more specifics on this process of state planning for foreign trade, see R. STARR,
supra note 20, at 60.
23 Ayre, Negotiating Commercial Contracts with the Soviets, 61 A.B.A.-J. 835 (1975). The
State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations (deals with certain aspects of trade with
other socialist countries and Third World nations) and the State Committee on Science
and Technology (has the task of helping acquire foreign technology and skills) work closely
with the Foreign Trade Ministry; R. STARR, supra note 21, at 27.
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and negotiate the contract. 2 There were 61 FTOs operating as of 1974.25
Usually, each FTO takes care of the Soviet Union's entire requirements
for a particular product. 26 For example, the Soyuznefteksport FTO han-
dles all Soviet exports and imports of oil and oil products. The Stan-
koimport FTO exports and imports machine tools and ball bearings. 27
The effect is to give the Soviet buyer tremendous leverage with the
American seller who must compete with other Western firms for this
controlled market.
The FrOs are legal entities. They may acquire property rights in
their own name, rather than in the name of the Soviet state, and may sue
or be sued.2s Incentives in the form of bonuses and other benefits are
given to encourage profits. The annual net profits are turned over to the
state treasury as state income.29
Even though the FTOs have legal autonomy and certain economic
powers, they are still part of the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade and are
ultimately responsible to the CPSU for their actions. A Party organiza-
tion exists within each FTO and intervenes actively in its administra-
tive operations. 30 The main purposes of the Party organization are to
insure loyalty to Party doctrine and to promote work efficiency. 31
Problem Areas
Althought the Soviet approach to international law, 32 to a system of
economic planning, and to foreign trade monopoly greatly facilitate the
24 Ayre, supra note 23, at 835. The main branches of each FTO are mostly located in
Moscow. To the effect that FTOs are good credit risks, see Ayre, id. at 838: "It is doubtful
whether there has been any litigation for collection or specific performance brought against
an FTO;" also to this effect, see Kiralfy, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in EAST -
WEST BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 314 (R. Starr ed. 1974).
25 R. STARR, supra note 20, at 30.
26 Duncan, Selling the Soviets: A Story of Problems and Profits, 3 AM. REv. OF SOVIET
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN TRADE 2, 39 (1967); Ayre, supra note 23, at 836.
27 R. STARR, supra note 20, at 31. For a complete list of the names of all Soviet FTOs as
of 1974 and their general areas of commercial activity, see id. 31-32. Also, the charter of each
FTO describes the specific range of its activity.
28 R. STARR, supra note 20, at 31.
29 Id., at 31.
30 J. RESHETAR, supra note 1, at 148.
3 1 Functionally organized primary Party organizations are found not only in FTOs, but
also in any Soviet enterprise, institution, farm, or military unit. They number about
350,000. J. RESHETAR, supra note 1, at 128. For more on CPSU organization and super-
vision, see id. at 128-150.
32 Party ideology dictates a distinctive approach to international law. The U.S.S.R. in-
sists that international norms be based on the express consent of states, preferably in treaty
form. It also asserts Soviet state sovereignty on every occasion. This approach significant-
ly timits the extent to which the Soviet Union will be bound by laws other than those
they have made. The minimal role that Soviet international lawyers seem to play in de-
termining foreign policy indicates the subordination of international law to foreign policy
in the U.S.S.R.; Butler, American Research on Soviet Approaches to Public International Law,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 188, 222-227 (1970).
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use of international trade as an instrument of foreign policy, 33 Soviet
traders must still deal with market forces arising in both controlled and
free world market economies. Problems in two important areas, arbi-
tration and payment, illustrate the difficulties that arise when the two
economic systems interact.
The Soviets have always expressed great reluctance to submit to
commercial arbitration in foreign jurisdictions. 34 In 1932, the Soviet gov-
ernment established the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FTAC)
so that foreign trade disputes might be settled in Moscow by Soviet citi-
zens. 35 Today the Soviets ardently seek to include an agreement to sub-
mit all disputes to FTAC jurisdiction in all contracts concluded with
Western businessmen. However, FTAC rules differ greatly from those
with which American businessmen are more accustomed. 36 Western
traders remain wary of agreeing to FTAC arbitration in the Soviet
capital. 37
There has been some question of whether foreign national courts
should enforce decisions of the FTAC in the absence of a treaty pro-
vision. It has been argued that the FTAC is a national court since all its
members are Soviet nationals and the right to foreign counsel has been
somewhat limited in the past.38 Even so, United States practice has been
to recognize the judgments of the FTAC. 3 9 . However, the Soviet Union
has steadfastly refused to enforce foreign commercial arbitral awards in
the absence of a prior agreement with the rendering nation.40
In 1972, the US and the USSR entered into a bilateral trade agreement
containing an arbitration provision. 41 The provision called for arbitra-
tion of commercial disputes in third countries that are parties to the 1958
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. Though the trade agreement is not presently
33 For a brief discussion of the interrelation of foreign policy and economic policy, see
Osakwe, supra note 1, at 85.
34 R. STARR, supra note 20, at 175.
35 In April, 1975, the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet replaced the 1932 de-
cree with a modern statute but the FTAC remains essentially the same. Statute on the
Foreign Arbitration Commission attached to the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and In-
dustry, 35 INT'L LEG. MAT., 1035 (1975).
36 E.g., The American Arbitration Association and the International Chamber of Com-
merce.
37 R. STARR, supra note 20, at 176.
38 Id., at 179.
39 Id., at 179.
40 Ginsberg. Soviet International Trade Contracts and the Execution of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, in CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HAZARD
204 (D. Barry ed. 1974).
41 U.S. - U.S.S.R. Agreement on Trade, 11 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1321 (1972); see Article
7 at 1327.
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in effect, 42 the US and the Soviet Union have begun using third country
arbitral forums, such as Sweden, rather than the Moscow FTAC. 43
A second important problem area in US-USSR trade concerns means
of payment. The general shortage of convertible currencies in the Soviet
Union makes the Western businessman reluctant to conclude a contract
calling for payment in rubles. If he accepts rubles at the Soviet official
exchange rate, he must then exchange them on the currency market at a
price well below the international rate.4 4 At the risk of discouraging
potential Soviet buyers, Western exporters frequently mark up their
initial price to include the possibility of lost foreign exchange earnings. 45
One possible means of avoiding the exchange problem is a com-
modity pay-back arrangement. The Soviets employ this arrangement
extensively in Western Europe and Japan. For example, in return for
Japanese aid in extracting Russian timber and coal, the USSR supplies
Japan with vast amounts of those two products. 46 While this method may
be attractive when payments are made in Soviet natural resources, it may
not be acceptable when repayment is in low quality consumer goods. 47
Most Western countries trading with the Soviets have alleviated the
payment problem by extending partial or complete credit terms to the
Soviet Union. 48 In this regard, Congress has placed two restrictions upon
extension of American credit. First, in 1974, Congress amended the 1945
Export-Import Bank Act to place a $300,000,000 ceiling on extension of
credit to the Soviet Union.49 Second, the 1934 Johnson Debt Default
Act5 0 effectively prohibits private general purpose loans to the Soviet
Union.5 1 The Johnson Act does not cover an extension of private corn-
merical credit as part of a specific export transaction, but it is not always
clear whether or not the Act will apply to a particular transaction. 52
Besides the difficulties that arbitration and payment present, a num-
42 See text accompanying note 61 infra.
43 R. STARR, supra note 20, at 180.
44 E. TAMEDLY, SOCIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 268 (1969).
4
5 Id., at 268.
46 Patolichev, supra note 16, at 30.
47 France had attempted another solution in the 1950s and early 1960s. It agreed with
the Soviet Union to trade in equal value. This plan failed because the French government
had no way of assuring that its entrepreneurs would buy a volume of Soviet goods at least
equal to that imported by the Soviet government. Lopatkiewicz, Institutionalizing East-
West Commercial Relations: the Franco-Soviet Experience, 15 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 12 (1974).
48 The United States even extended credit to the Russians at substantially below-
market interest rates to purchase wheat in 1972. Stevenson, Detente and Dollar Diplomacy,
9 INT'L LAWYER 733, 736 (1975).
49 Pub. L. No. 93-646 § 8(b)(Jan. 4, 1975), 88 Stat. 2336, amending 12 U.S.C. § 635(e).
50 18 U.S.C. § 955.
51 Hoya, The United States, in EAST-WEST BUSINESS TRANSACTION 9 (R. Starr ed.
1974).
52 Id.
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ber of other problems have inhibited Soviet-American trade. Following
the expansion of communist powers in Eastern Europe and Asia in the
1940s, the US imposed an elaborate system of legal restraints, in the
name of national security, on trade with communist countries.5 3 Strate-
gic factors dictated a policy of restricting the flow of sophisticated Ameri-
can technology to the growing Soviet bloc.5 4 Although this policy has
been relaxed with the advent of detente, Soviet customers are still sub-
jected to more red tape and delays in buying from the US than from any
other Western nation.5s Consequently, US industries are often at a com-
petitive disadvantage.
The Soviet Union has increasingly sought cooperative projects with
the West in order to develop many of its natural resources. However, it
usually has attempted to apportion this work among commercial inter-
ests of different nations so that no capitalist country can acquire con-
trol of an important sector of the Soviet economy.56
If the American businessman visits the USSR, he encounters various
other trading problems. The Soviet Government imposes travel restric-
tions which make it difficult to pursue an effective marketing program.57
The lack of contact between American suppliers and Soviet consumers
inhibits development of effective sales strategies.5 8 Furthermore, the
Party limits access to Soviet economic data, the consideration of which is
necessary to the making of intelligent business decisions.5 9 The US
trader can also expect to encounter difficulties in obtaining local office
space and legal and secretarial services. 60
Conclusion
Primarily as a result of a lessening of ideological conflict between the
US and the USSR, trade relations between the two countries have im-
proved vastly during the past fifteen years. In 1972, the US and the Soviet
Union entered into a series of agreements which established a compre-
hensive legal framework for the development of trade between the two
53 Until recently, Washington has withheld political and legal support from interests
seeking expanded commercial relations with the East. The U. S. had originally taken this
position, in part, for economic reasons. It was feared that the communist states would flood
Western markets with goods at less than cost. Lopatkiewicz, supra note 47, at 46.
54 E. TAMEDLY, supra note 44, at 267.
55 Duncan, supra note 26, at 39. For one American businessman's experience, see gen-
erally id., pp. 38-53.
56 Lopatkiewicz, supra note 47, at 46. It is not, however, certain to what extent this
practice is due to strategic and ideological reasons, and to what extent it reflects the in-
ability of one country to finance large Soviet projects. Thus, it is possible that the foreign
investment capacity of the U. S. may prove an asset in the future for improving U. S.-Soviet
economic relations.
57 Duncan, supra note 26, at 38.
58 Osakwe, supra note 1, at 114.
59 Duncan, supra note 26, at 38.
60 Osakwe, supra note 1, at 114.
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nations. 61 In 1974, Congress passed a Trade Act which approved the
1972 agreements but which included a "freedom of emigration" stipu-
lation. 62 Shortly thereafter, the USSR informed the US government that
it would not accept a trading relationship based on the 1974 Trade Act
legislation.
Still, the 1972 US-USSR Trade Agreement reflected a favorable
climate for increasing trade with the Soviet Union. The 1972 Moscow
summit established the Joint US-USSR Commercial Commission, which
remains in operation. The Commission was created to resolve various
economic problems between the two countries, and was responsible for
putting together the 1972 Agreement. 63
The gradual rise in Soviet and East European standards continues
to generate pressures for making new and greater quantities of con-
sumer goods available. The result may be increased trade with Western
countries. For example, in 1974 West European trade with East European
nations increased 43%. 64 American businessmen will surely participate
in this favorable trade climate.
However, there are limitations on the extent of US trade expansion
with the Soviet Union. Size, natural resources, and an advanced indus-
trial base provide the USSR with the potential for economic self-suffi-
ciency. Moreover, industrialized East European nations provide the
Soviet Union with convenient trading partners on its borders. Competi-
tion from other Western nations for the Russian market will probably in-
crease.
American domestic factors, such as concern over Soviet emigration
policy, also threaten the development of US-Soviet trade. Solzhenitsyn's
revelations about Soviet forced-labor camps had a substantial impact on
American opinion about conditions in Soviet Russia. 65 Furthermore,
reluctance to trade with the USSR, except on a basis of mutual and
equal economic benefit, is shared by the substantial segment of Con-
gress and US citizenry. 66
61 Supra note 41, at 1321-1346.
62 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in scattered sections of
5, 19,26, 31 U.S.C.) (Jan. 3, 1975). See Title IV, sect. 401, at 220; making the implementation
of U.S.-Soviet trade contingent on Congressional approval of Soviet emigration quotas for
Soviet Jews.
63 R. STARR, supra note 20, at 84.
64 The Wall Street Journal, November 17, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
65 E.g., A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (ONE AND Two), (1974).
66 Stevenson, supra note 48, at 733-739. In a speech before the National Institute on
East-West Investment, in April 1975, Senator Adlai Stevenson decried the original Nixon
policy of granting indiscriminate subsidized credit in order to assure increased U.S.-
Soviet trade: "The issue is largely to what extent the U. S. should subsidize the develop-
ment of the Soviet Union in order to obtain short-run, economic benefits, and seek to in-
fluence Soviet policy;" id., 733. In the same speech he suggests that even should the U. S.
gain access to Soviet energy resources, such as oil, it would be unwise for the U. S. to in-
crease its dependence on foreign sources of essential raw materials; id., 734.
